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NOTES
Foreign Attachment Power Constrained-An End
to Quasi In Rem Jurisdiction?
Pennsylvania's foreign attachment procedures were held to be an
unconstitutional violation of due process by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. This note analyzes the
evolving concept of due process in its relation to summary sei-
zures and places the instant decision within that framework. The
author attempts to evaluate the court's attack of the attachment
statute's constitutionality based on a balancing test for proce-
dural due process as well as the concurring opinion's contention
that a minimum contacts test should replace quasi in rem
jurisdiction.
Elmer J. Jonnet, Jonnet Development Corp., and Jonnet En-
terprises, Inc. (collectively Jonnet) brought an action against Dollar
Savings Bank of the City of New York (Dollar) in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.' Jonnet
claimed damages in excess of $1,000,000, alleging that Dollar wrong-
fully failed to honor a mortgage commitment.2 Utilizing Pennsyl-
vania's foreign attachment procedures3 to obtain jurisdiction,4 Jon-
1. Jurisdiction in the federal district court was based on diversity of citizenship, 28
U.S.C. § 1332 (1970). Dollar is a New York corporation organized under the Banking Law of
New York whose principal place of business is in the Bronx, New York, and is not registered
to do business in Pennsylvania. Jonnet v. Dollar Say. Bank, 530 F.2d 1123, 1125 n.4 (3d Cir.
1976); Brief for Appellant at 3.
2. The $1,100,000.00 commitment was to be secured by a mortgage on a shopping center
in Monroeville, Pennsylvania. Jonnet claimed $1,285,394.74 in damages. Brief for Appellee
at 1-2; Brief for Appellant at 3.
3. In Lebowitz v. Forbes Leasing & Finance Corp., 326 F. Supp. 1335, 1340-41 (E.D. Pa.
1971), aff'd, 456 F.2d 979 (3d Cir. 1972), the court described the attachment procedures under
PA. R. Civ. P. §§ 1252-66 as follows:
A foreign attachment may be issued to attach property of a defendant not exempt
from execution. Where the defendant is subject to such action, any person owing
a debt to defendant, having property of the defendant in his custody, possession
or control, holding fiduciary property in which the defendant has an interest, or
holding legal title to property of the defendant may be made a garnishee. The
attachment is commenced by filing a praecipe for a writ with the prothonotary
which directs the sheriff to attach such items as are set forth in the praecipe and
all other property of the defendant. The prothonotary immediately enters the
attachment against the defendant in the judgment index. . . . The attachment
extends to the property after acquired by the garnishee. . . to any form of prop-
erty not exempt from execution. The rules authorize manual seizure by the sher-
iff. No bond or security is required of the plaintiff commencing the foreign attach-
ment by the sheriff except for the actual or estimated cost of obtaining possession
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net garnished two Pennsylvania accounts owed to Dollar.' After
securing dissolution of the attachment,' filing an answer, and con-
ducting discovery, Dollar moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.7
The district court granted the motion holding Pennsylvania's for-
eign attachment procedures unconstitutional.' On appeal,' the
of the property. Plaintiff is required to file a complaint setting forth his cause of
action but not until five days after the filing of the foreign attachment proceed-
ings.
4. The 1963 amendments to FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e) provided for the commencement of an
action in federal court by the use of state attachment procedures. For a general discussion of
FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e), see Notes of Advisory Committee on 1963 Amendment to Rules; 4 WRIGHT
& MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL §§ 1070, 1119-23. Furthermore, FED. R.
Civ. P. 64 authorizes the use of provisional remedies, including seizure of property, to secure
satisfaction of a subsequent judgment as provided by the law of the state in which the district
court sits. Such use, however, is subject to constitutional limitations. See 11 WRIGHT &
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL §§ 2931, 2932, 2934. Foreign attachment was
the only jurisdictional basis for suit in Pennsylvania since the state "long-arm" statute, 42
PA. C.S.A. §§ 8301 et seq. (Supp. 1976), excepted acquiring mortgages from its definition of
"doing business." 42 PA. C.S.A. § 8309 (c) (Supp. 1976).
5. Jonnet commenced the action by filing a "Complaint in Assumpsit with Foreign
Attachment" and several days later filed a praecipe for writ of foreign attachment in accord-
ance with PA. R. Civ. P. 1255. The United States Clerk of Court, as prothonotary, issued the
writs, and the United States Marshall served them on two Pennsylvania corporate garnishees,
Chrysler Realty Corporation owing Dollar $599,657.00 and A-1 Builders, Inc. owing Dollar
$763,654.11. The subsequent monthly installment from each garnishee was not paid to Dollar.
530 F.2d at 1125; Jonnet v. Dollar Say. Bank, 392 F. Supp. 1385, 1391 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
6. Upon motion, hearing, and subsequent posting of $50,000.00 security by Dollar, the
district court dissolved the attachments in accordance with PA. R. Civ. P. 1272 (c), 530 F.2d
at 1125.
7. Dollar argued that the foreign attachment procedures failed to comport with proce-
dural due process and thus could not sustain jurisdiction. Jonnet argued that Dollar, by filing
the security and conducting extensive discovery for over a year, waived the jurisdictional
issue. The court of appeals found, however, that the constitutional claim had been raised and
preserved at the initial motion for dissolution and in the answer to Jonnet's complaint. 530
F.2d at 1125 n.5.
8. Jonnet v. Dollar Say. Bank, 392 F. Supp. 1385 (W.D. Pa. 1975). The district court
judge applied a three-part test derived from Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 92 (1972), and
also compared the Pennsylvania prejudgment procedures to the doctrine enunciated in
Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974). Applying the Fuentes test, he found: (1)
the foreign attachment statute too broad since it could reach foreign defendants within
Pennsylvania's long-arm jurisdiction; (2) there was no need for prompt action; and (3) that
a clerk performing a purely ministerial function provided insufficient state control. Further-
more, the Pennsylvania statute had none of the saving characteristics enumerated in the
Mitchell decision. He noted the lack of: (1) judicial approval of the order; (2) the setting forth
of facts in support of the application; (3) a requirement of bond from the attaching creditor;
and (4) a right in the debtor to regain possession by posting bond. In summation, the proce-
dures lacked the requirement that there be a showing of the validity of the claim.
Due process is not served when one party to a dispute may, by mere unexamined
application to an official whose function is solely ministerial bring to bear the
state's enormous confiscatory power on its behalf.
392 F. Supp. at 1392-93.
9. The district court order of dismissal for lack of jurisdiction was final and appealable
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1970).
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United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held; affirmed:
Pennsylvania's foreign attachment procedures serve only the poten-
tial plaintiff's interests and provide insubstantial protection to the
prospective defendant against wrongful attachment, and thereby
deny fourteenth amendment procedural due process. Jonnet v. Dol-
lar Savings Bank, 530 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir. 1976).
Location of a defendant's property within the forum state's
boundaries has been a well established foundation for limited gen-
eral jurisdiction. 0 Although attachment procedures existed in the
English common law, the process of foreign attachment adopted in
the United States is statutory in nature and is based upon the
"Custom of London of Foreign Attachment.""
A territorial concept of jurisdiction, substantiating a state's
exclusive control over property within its border," led to the devel-
opment of quasi in rem jurisdiction. 3 Justified by a state's interest
in providing its citizens with a remedy for legal wrongs committed
by nonresidents, quasi in rem actions provided the citizens of a state
with a method of subjecting the "furtive defendant"" to liability to
the extent of his property interest within the state.
The establishment of quasi in rem jurisdiction through foreign
attachment varies among the states, 5 but a coincident historical
10. Limited general jurisdiction is jurisdiction to adjudicate any controversy but limited
in effectiveness to the property involved. It is a compromise necessitated by the balancing of
the unfairness to a defendant in compelling him to litigate in a remote forum under a threat
of default with the interest of a state in providing a forum for its citizens against defendants
who, absenting themselves from the state, have thwarted in personam jurisdiction. Carring-
ton, The Modern Utility of Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction 76 HARV. L. REV. 303, 304-05 (1962).
Any procedures which do not allow a limited appearance are highly suspect. Von Mehren &
Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARv. L. REV. 1121, 1139
n.38 (1966). But see Note, Developments in the Law-State Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 909, 953 (1960).
11. Beale, The Exercise of Jurisdiction in Rem to Compel Payment of a Debt, 27 HARV.
L. REV. 107, 111 (1913). For a discussion of the differences between attachment at common
law and the "Custom of London," see C. DRAKE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SUITS By ATTACH-
MENT 1-8 (7th ed. 1891); R. MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE 485-99 (1952).
12. The basic principle that a state court's action is limited to persons and things physi-
cally related to the state's territory has been implemented through the "full faith and credit"
and "due process" clauses of the Constitution. The evolution of jurisdictional theory has
brought this territorial conception and those procedures it has justified under recent attack.
See notes 76-80 infra and accompanying text.
13. Quasi in rem jurisdiction is neither in personam nor in rem. Jurisdiction is based on
the court's power over the tangible or intangible property, but it does not deal with the
property because of any right asserted in the property itself. 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1070.
14. For an example of the continued vitality of this reasoning see RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 66 comment (a) (1969).
15. For this reason authorities from other states and general statements in text books
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background permits several generalizations. Attachment, the pro-
cess by which tangible and intangible property is brought into the
custody of the court, 6 is typically accomplished, with regard to
intangibles, by personal service of a writ of garnishment upon an
obligor of the nonresident defendant. The writ may be attacked by
the garnishee by denying the obligation or by the defendant on the
grounds that the property is not subject to attachment. 7 In practice,
the process of foreign attachment has effectively served the two-fold
purpose of establishing jurisdiction in a desired forum and securing
the property attached for satisfaction of any subsequent judgment.
However, since ratification of the fourteenth amendment in 1868,
states have been required to proceed under the constitutional prohi-
bitions against depriving any person of his property without due
process of law.
Recently, the traditional precepts of due process " under the
fifth and fourteenth amendments have been substantially restruc-
tured. The two fundamentals of due process, notice and an oppor-
tunity for a hearing," had generally been deemed satisfied if af-
forded before final deprivation of property, especially where an im-
portant governmental or public interest demanded immediate sei-
zure of private property." Prior to 1969, summary seizure for a pri-
must be specifically related to the statute of the particular state in which the action is
contemplated in order to put the particular procedure in its proper perspective.
16. The requirement of seizure was enunciated in Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877),
as a necessary prerequisite to establishing and maintaining jurisdiction and to fulfilling the
notice requirements of due process. The argument has been advanced that prior attachment
is unnecessary since the state has continuing power over the property found within its terri-
tory at the commencement of an action and since notice can be served without seizure of the
property. Hazard, A General Theory of State Court Jurisdiction, 1965 SuP. CT. REV. 241, 268-
69, 277.
17. Comment, A New Expansion of Jurisdiction?, 6 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 105, 123 (1974).
18. Due process is perhaps the most majestic concept in our whole constitu-
tional system. While it contains the garnered wisdom of the past in assuring
fundamental justice, it is also a living principle not confined to past instances.
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 174 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
The concept of due process was designed to prevent arbitrary deprivation of property by
the government and, as currently interpreted, derives from conformity to natural principles
of justice. Reasonableness of the notion is achieved through the process of adjustment by
balancing the conflicting interest involved in light of present social, economic, and philosoph-
ical norms. See id. at 163; 1970 Wisc. L. REV. 181, 185.
19. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950); Baldwin v.
Hale, 68 U.S. (1 Wall) 223, 233 (1863).
20. Balancing the interest of the property owner in continued possession and use of the
property against the interest of the state in summary seizure, the Supreme Court of the
United States held that due process did not require a hearing before seizure, provided that
the interests of the property owner were adequately protected by a post-seizure hearing.
Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950) (confiscation of misbranded
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vate purpose was considered directly by the United States Supreme
Court in McKay v. McInnes" which upheld the Maine attachment
procedure permitting seizure without a prior hearing, and indirectly
in Ownbey v. Morgan" which sustained the Delaware foreign at-
tachment statute's requirement that a nonresident defendant,
whose property had been attached, post bond as a prerequisite to
court access.
In Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,3 the Court unveiled a
new perspective on procedural due process by holding Wisconsin's
garnishment statute unconstitutional. The statutory procedures al-
lowed a clerk of the court to issue a summons at the request of the
creditor's lawyer and, prior to a hearing on the merits, the wage
earner was deprived of his earned wages. Finding that the wage
garnishment involved was a deprivation of property," the Court
concluded that the procedures utilized, in failing to provide the
defendant with notice and a prior hearing, did not comport with due
process requirements."5 Aside from the factual uniqueness of the
pharmaceutical products); Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947) (control of a federal sav-
ings and loan association to protect the public from a bank failure); Yakus v. United States,
321 U.S. 414 (1944) (upholding price and rent controls during a war); Phillips v. Comm'r,
253 U.S. 589 (1931) (enforcement of a federal tax lien to provide needed revenue); North Am.
Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908) (protecting the public from unwholesome
food); Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894) (confiscation of illegal fishing equipment).
21. 279 U.S. 820 (1929). The per curiam opinion relied on Coffin Bros. & Co. v. Bennett,
277 U.S. 29 (1928) and Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921). These authorities appear to
be of dubious value. Coffin Bros. dealt with an attachment involving a governmental public
interest rather than a private interest following a bank failure. Ownbey is discussed in note
22 infra and accompanying text.
22. 256 U.S. 94 (1921). Ownbey, unable to post bond, constitutionally attacked the
denial of access, not the validity of summary foreign attachment as a jurisdictional device,
although this was necessarily assumed in the Court's decision. The decision was based on the
"ancient lineage" of foreign attachment, id. at 108-09, the right of a state to condition the
conversion of a quasi in rem proceeding into an in personam proceeding upon such bond, id.
at 107-08, and a theory of implied consent by the nonresident property owner, id. at 111. It
has been suggested that the rationales of Ownbey are no longer valid and that the case would
be decided differently today. See Levy, Attachment, Garnishment and Garnishment Execu-
tion: Some American Problems Considered in the Light of the English Experience, 25 CONN.
L, REV. 399, 401 (1972-73); Comment, Foreign Attachment After Sniadach and Fuentes, 73
COLUM. L. REv. 342, 345 (1973).
23. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
24. The prejudgment deprivation of wages was described as one that "may as a practical
matter drive a wage earning family to the wall." Id. at 341-42. As one commentator observed,
Justice Douglas appeared to put property on a continuum making "suspect" any seizure of
property vital to life. Comment, The Constitutional Validity of Attachment in Light of
Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 17 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 837, 840-41 (1970).
25. The decision is unclear as to the test used to strike down the statute. The Court
appears to somewhat side step the normal balancing approach implicit in the natural law
view of due process by focusing on the deprivation aspect. See also Note, Garnishment of
Wages Prior to Judgment Is a Denial of Due Process: The Sniadach Case and Its Implications
for Related Areas of the Law, 68 MICH. L. REV. 986, 998 (1970).
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case, the scope of the decision was limited by an "extraordinary
situations" exception which left open the possibility that other such
summary procedures could be upheld."
The implications of Sniadach's holding could not logically be
confined to wages. Consequently, consumer debtors successfully
assailed other pre-judgment summary seizure practices. 7
The challenge to foreign attachment tactics materialized in
Lebowitz v. Forbes Leasing & Finance Corp.2" In responding to the
Sniadach decision, the district court weighed the competing inter-
ests and found a sufficiently valid state interest in providing a forum
for in-state creditors if a debtor had property within the state. Even
though the statute was perceived to suffer from the same infirmity
denounced in Sniadach, i.e., that it encompassed situations where
in personam jurisdiction would be available, the court felt con-
strained by Ownbey and McKay to uphold the statute.
Ironically, the court of appeals affirmed29 the district court deci-
sion, although upon a different theory. The court refused to find
that the statute was too broad and stated that the presence of a
long-arm statute would not necessarily obviate a need for foreign
attachment. An in-state creditor could be prejudiced by prolonged
litigation regarding the applicability of the long-arm statute,
26. In Sniadach the Court did not find a situation requiring special protection of either
a state or creditor interest. The Court also found that the statute did not narrowly encompass
an "extraordinary situation." It did find that in personam jurisdiction was available. 395
U.S. at 339. The references to availability of in personam jurisdiction and Ownbey would
appear to place foreign attachment outside the Sniadach doctrine. See The Supreme Court,
1968 Term, 83 H~Auv. L. REV. 7, 113, 116 (1969); Comment, supra note 24, at 843 n.45; Note,
supra note 25, at 1003.
27. E.g., Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191 (1972) (confession of judgment against debtors
earning less than $10,000 per year, without prior notice and hearing held unconstitutional);
Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (requiring uninsured motorist involved in an automobile
accident to post bond or forfeit driver's license prior to trial on the merits held unconstitu-
tional); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971) (prior notice and hearing required
before labeling a person a public drunk and precluding him from purchasing liquor); Goldberg
v. Kelley, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare benefits could not be terminated without prior notice
and hearing). For a discussion of the liberal interpretation given to Sniadach by the federal
and state courts in various areas of the law see West & Berman, The Issue of Sniadach, 79
CoM. L.J. 49 (1974). For a compilation of lower federal court cases applying Sniadach see
Comment, supra note 22 at 343 nn.7 & 8.
28. 326 F. Supp. 1335 (E.D. Pa. 1971). A Pennsylvania resident filed a state court action
against his former corporate employer alleging wrongful discharge. The employer, a foreign
corporation not entitled to do business in Pennsylvania, responded to the attachment of its
two Pennsylvania bank accounts, totaling approximately $75,000, by removing the case to
federal district court on diversity grounds and arguing that the attachments violated due
process. Pursuant to PA. R. Civ. P. 1251-79, 1285-92, the attachments had been issued without
notice or a hearing.
29. Lebowitz v. Forbes Leasing & Fin. Corp., 456 F.2d 979 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 843, rehearing denied, 409 U.S. 1049 (1972).
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whereas foreign attachment provided a certain basis for jurisdic-
tion. 0 Although expressing reservations regarding post-appearance
attachment, the Third Circuit evidently also felt bound by Ownbey
and McKay.3'
The United States Supreme Court specifically ratified a broad
reading of Sniadach when pre-judgment replevin statutes were
found to violate procedural due process in Fuentes v. Shevin. 2 In
rejecting the grounds relied upon by the district courts3 to uphold
the statutes, the Court attempted to clarify its view of due process. 4
In dicta it pronounced three factors which were to circumscribe the
"extraordinary situations" justification for postponing notice and
opportunity for a hearing: (1) a necessity that the seizure secure an
important governmental or general public interest; (2) a necessity
for very prompt action; and (3) strict state control through a govern-
ment official determining the necessity and justification for the sei-
zure according to the standards of a narrowly drawn statute. 5 De-
30. Id. at 982.
31. Id. For a view contrary to the jurisdictional premise of the court of appeals in
Lebowitz, see Tucker v. Burton, 319 F. Supp. 567, 577 (D.D.C. 1970) (Wright, J., dissenting).
Judge Wright found that the unavailability of in personam jurisdiction was an "extraordinary
situation" justifying attachment.
32. 407 U.S. 67, rehearing denied, 409 U.S. 902 (1972). By a vote of 4-3, the Court struck
down the Florida and Pennsylvania replevin statutes. The statutes permitted a private party,
without having to make a convincing pre-seizure showing that the property was wrongfully
held, to obtain a writ of replevin by applying to a court clerk and posting a double-value bond.
The property held by the defendant would then be seized by a sheriff at the same time the
defendant received the complaint. Id. at 73-78.
33. The district court opinions are found at Fuentes v. Faircloths, 317 F. Supp. 954 (S.D.
Fla. 1970) and Epps v. Cortese, 326 F. Supp. 127 (E.D. Pa. 1971). They had relied on a narrow
interpretation of Sniadach and Goldberg v. Kelley, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) in holding that the
household items under the replevin statutes were not items of necessity requiring due process
protection.
34. The due process rights to notice and hearing are required to prevent arbitrary en-
croachment and to minimize unwarranted deprivation of property. They are not created to
determine whether the seizure is necessary to secure an important governmental interest or
whether there is a need for very prompt action. Therefore, notice and a hearing must be
granted when deprivation can still be prevented. A later hearing and compensation would
not correct even a temporary deprivation that would have been subject to the right of proce-
dural due process. 407 U.S. at 81-82. Distinctions based upon the "necessity" of the property
to the debtor would not allow an objective application of the principle behind procedural due
process. Id. at 90. Therefore, it is clear that the requirement of a pre-seizure hearing does not
depend on the remedy sou'ght, the property involved, the length of deprivation, or the severity
of collateral consequences. Unfortunately, the Court did not stipulate a set of minimum
standards with regard to the nature of the pre-seizure hearing but rather reserved the area
for legislation. Id. at 96-97.
35. 407 U.S. at 91. The Court indicated that it had drawn these criteria from Coffin Bros.
& Co. v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29 (1928) (attachment necessary to protect the public from bank
failure); Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921) (attachment necessary to secure jurisdiction
in state court, clearly a most basic and important public interest); and McKay v. McInnes,
279 U.S. 820 (1929) (which the Court limited to the doctrines established in Coffin Bros. and
19771
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spite these standards and the theoretical due process clarification,
the Court's approach remained obtuse.3" Apparently avoiding a bal-
ancing test, the Court only looked to see if a constitutionally signifi-
cant deprivation was involved, and once one was found looked to the
adequacy of the procedures.
Within 2 years, the theory of due process espoused in Fuentes
was eclipsed by the Court's recognition of a creditor's interest in
secured property in Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co.37 In sustaining
Louisiana's sequestration (seizure of goods) procedures,38 the Court
applied a balancing test and thus reaffirmed the traditional notion
Ownbey). Id. at 91 n.23. These cases would not appear to support a requirement that all three
factors be met, but the Court did list examples of all three in a reference to seizure under a
search warrant. Id. at 93 n.30. One commentator suggests that only the third criteria is
essential. Even so, he concludes that as a practical matter, a situation involving private
creditors and debtors will fail to qualify as an "extraordinary situation" regardless of the
number of criteria applied. 48 WASH. L. REV. 646, 658-59 (1973). For the view that summary
foreign attachment procedures suffer from the same deficiencies as the replevin statutes see
Comment, supra note 22 at 347-49. That author also suggests that by the Fuentes criteria,
nonresidence of a defendant would not justify foreign attachment if other means of jurisdic-
tion were available and continued post-appearance attachment would require an unusual
threat to a creditor's security. Id. at 352. See also Note, Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction and Due
Process Requirements, 82 YALE L,J. 1023 (1973),
36. The dissenters stated their theory:
"[Wihat procedures due process may require under any given set of circumstan-
ces must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the government
function involved as well as of the private interest that has been affected by
governmental action."
407 U.S. at 101-02 citing Cafeteria Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961). The Court,
retreating from its apparent willingness to apply an "extraordinary situations" exception,
specifically refused to allow notions of efficiency and cost to limit the hearing requirement.
Id. at 90-91 n.22. For an economic analysis of the ramifications of Fuentes see Brownstein,
Sniadach and Fuentes: The Challenge and the Aftermath, 78 COM. L.J. 13, 15 (1973). Al-
though the creditors in Fuentes had a legal interest in the seized property through conditional
sales contracts, the Court refused to discuss it as a factor. This led the Court subsequently
in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), to state that the test to be applied with regard
to procedural due process protection:
[I]s not merely the "weight" of the individual's interest, but whether the nature
of the interest is one within the contemplation . . . of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.
Id. at 481. At the very least, the Court's approach would seem to further indicate a shift in
emphasis begun in Sniadach.
37. 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
38. LSA-C.C.P. arts. 281-83, 3501, 3571. Sequestration (seizure of goods) was allowed
upon an ex parte claim of ownership, where the nature of the claim and the grounds for
issuance of the writ clearly appeared from specific facts set forth in a verified petition if the
debtor had any opportunity to jeopardize the claimant's interest. 416 U.S. at 605. The judge
was required to issue the writ of sequestration in Orleans Parish, where the case arose. Id. at
606 n.5. The creditor was required to post bond and the debtor could seek immediate
dissolution, which had to be ordered absent creditor proof of the grounds, and the debtor
could repossess, in any event, by posting bond. Id. at 606-07.
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of procedural due process.39 Fuentes was not overruled ° except to
the extent that it required notice and hearing prior to any depriva-
tion of property.' For guidance, the Mitchell decision enumerated
several safeguards within the sequestration process found to be im-
portant in the balancing framework: (1) judicial control; (2) the
amount and nature of information necessary to clearly establish
grounds for seizure; (3) bond posted by the creditor; (4) a prompt
post-seizure hearing at which continued enforcement issues could be
resolved; and (5) burden of probable cause for seizure on the credi-
tor.42
Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.43 decided after
39. "Resolution of the due process question must take account not only of the interests
of the buyer of the property but those of the seller as well." 416 U.S. at 604, quoting Cafeteria
Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961). The Court criticized the Fuentes approach:
"The very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally
applicable to every imaginable situation." 416 U.S. at 610. Quoting from Ewing v. Mytinger
& Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594, 599 (1950), the Court retreated from the Fuentes rule: "It
is sufficient where only property rights are concerned, that there is at some stage an opportun-
ity for a hearing and a judicial determination." 416 U.S. at 612. For further support the Court
cited to Coffin Bros., Ownbey, and McKay. Id. at 613. However, the validity of the prejudg-
ment remedies supported in those cases cannot be considered determined by the Mitchell
decision because the Court indicated that its present decision did not control the situation
where creditors had no present interest in the property to be seized. Id. at 604. This lends
credence to the view that the Mitchell holding is quite limited in scope. For a discussion
supporting the limited view of Mitchell, see 41 BROOKLYN L. REV. 380, 388 (1974). For staunch
support of the Mitchell approach to due process, in so far as it appears that the Court will
not vindicate its abstract or subjective notions of due process, but rather will leave the social,
economic, and political questions to the legislators, see Phillips, Revolution and Counterrevo-
lution: The Supreme Court on Creditor's Remedies, 3 FORD URB. L.J. 1, 29-30 (1974).
40. The Court attempted to distinguish Fuentes on the basis of procedures involved in
the replevin statutes rather than overruling the prior decision on due process concepts. This
suggests that Fuentes would have been decided similarly by the Mitchell Court. Unfortun-
ately, upon close analysis, the saving characteristics attributed to the sequestration proce-
dures (see note 42 infra and accompanying text) appear to be constitutionally indistin-
guishable from the procedures struck down in Fuentes. See Justice Stewart's dissent, 416 U.S.
at 632-34; 88 HARV. L. REV. 71, 76-82 (1974); Comment, Commercial Transactions: The
Future of Self-Help Repossession, 8 J. MAR. J. oF PRAC. & PROC. 96 (1974). Furthermore, the
seller's security interest was found sufficient for state protection in Mitchell, whereas Fuentes
had denied protection to a stronger interest of legal title. The policy of preventing violent self-
help measures referred to in Mitchell was equally applicable in Fuentes.
41. Both the Mitchell conceptual view of procedural due process and the fact that the
sequestration process did not meet the governmental/general public interest requirement of
Fuentes' "extraordinary situation" exception support this conclusion. See also Justice Pow-
ell's concurring opinion, 416 U.S. at 623.
42. 416 U.S. at 615-18. It appears that the Court modified the governmental/general
public interest requirement of Fuentes to include individual creditor interest but retained the
other two Fuentes criteria. (See text preceding note 35 supra for the Fuentes criteria.)
43. 416 U.S. 663, rehearing denied, 417 U.S. 977 (1974). The Court, through Justice
Brennan, reversed the district court which had found that the Puerto Rican Seizure Act, 34
L.P.R.A. § 1722 (1971), did not meet due process requirements since there were no provisions
whereby the seizure could be contested before it had been made. See Pearson Yacht Leasing
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Mitchell, presented the Court with a further opportunity to clarify
its due process doctrine. Perplexingly, however, the Court purported
to rely on Fuentes4 in upholding the seizure and forfeiture, under
Puerto Rican law, of a pleasure yacht carrying marijuana. The
Calero decision consequently failed to enlighten the lower courts in
their search for the correct interpretation of United States Supreme
Court precedents. 5
The most recent pronouncement by the United Stateg Supreme
Court relating to due process in the area of summary prejudgment
remedies is North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc.'" The
Court struck down the Georgia garnishment statute47 on due process
grounds similar to those propounded in Fuentes."5 The Court dis-
Co. v. Massa, 363 F. Supp. 1337, 1342 (D.P.R. 1973).
44. The Court analyzed the seizure with reference solely to the Fuentes "extraordinary
situations" criteria. Concurring, Justices White and Powell agreed with the Fuentes analysis
of the Puerto Rican statutes but, citing Mitchell, added that the existence of an important
public interest was only one of the situations not requiring a prior hearing. 416 U.S. at 691.
Justice Douglas, however, the sole dissenter, indicated the weakness of the Fuentes analysis.
He found no need for prompt action since the seizure had taken place 2 months after discovery
of the marijuana aboard the yacht. Id. In essence, it appeared that the Court was willing to
be liberal in its interpretation of the Fuentes criteria, suggesting an overlap in principle of
the Mitchell and Fuentes decisions, since any other attempt at reconciling the Fuentes result
with that in Mitchell would find reference to Fuentes redundant.
45. The lower federal courts appeared to apply a mechanical comparison of the statute
at issue with those in Fuentes and Mitchell. See, e.g., Garner v. Tri-State Dev. Co., 382 F.
Supp. 377 (E.D. Mich. 1974); Garcia v. Krausse, 380 F. Supp. 1254 (S.D. Tex. 1974). The
weight ascribed to the safeguards listed in Mitchell has varied. See, e.g., Guzman v. Western
State Bank, 381 F. Supp. 1262 (D.N.D. 1974) (replevin statute upheld without a requirement
for judicial control); Woods v. Tennessee, 378 F. Supp. 1364 (W.D. Tenn. 1974) (replevin
statute upheld without a requirement for an immediate post-seizure hearing).
46. 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
47. 46 GA. CODE ANN. §§ 101-05 (1973). The statute authorized a plaintiff to make an
affidavit to a court clerk asserting the amount due and claiming apprehension that loss would
be sustained if garnishment did not issue. Plaintiff was required to file double bond and
defendant could dissolve the garnishment by filing bond. 419 U.S. at 602-03. This was a
typical post-Sniadach garnishment statute exempting wages. In Di-Chem, a court clerk is-
sued a summons of garnishment upon ex parte allegations of an amount owed from a sale of
goods, whereby defendant's bank account was garnished. After filing a release bond, the
defendant moved to dismiss the writ on constitutional due process grounds.
48. The Georgia court had upheld the statute, distinguishing Sniadach as a wage
earner's exception to a general rule of garnishment statute validity. North Georgia Finishing,
Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 231 Ga. 260, 264, 201 S.E.2d 321, 323 (1973). The Supreme Court of
the United States indicated that the Georgia court's narrow view of Sniadach had not consid-
ered Fuentes. Justice White concluded that the Georgia procedures suffered from the same
vulnerability as those found unconstitutional in Fuentes. The Court reaffirmed the principle
espoused in Fuentes that even a temporary deprivation is constrained by notions of due
process requiring protection against wrongful action. 419 U.S. at 605-06. However, as in
Mitchell, there is no reference to the Fuentes rule requiring a hearing before any deprivation.
Justice White reaffirmed the Fuentes rule with the Mitchell gloss that "other safeguards"
would satisfy due process. Id. This may indicate that only Fuentes' conclusion remains.
However, Justice Stewart's and Justice Powell's concurring opinions, 419 U.S. at 608 and
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carded the balancing approach and distinguished Mitchell through
a mechanical comparison of Georgia garnishment procedures with
the safeguarding characteristics of the Louisiana sequestration pro-
cedures. 9 Reaffirming the factors it considered salient, the Court
observed that under the Georgia garnishment statute the supporting
affidavit need only be conclusory, the writ could be issued without
judicial participation, and there was no provision for a prompt post-
seizure hearing.5" The Di-Chem decision removed the consumer
debtor status as a boundary for due process attack on prejudgment
remedies.
These developments in interpreting due process standards in
prejudgment seizures were the foundation for the majority decision
in Jonnet declaring Pennsylvania's foreign attachment statute un-
constitutional. This decision was founded upon two separate theo-
ries based on divergent lines of due process analysis.5 The majority
phrased the issue as:
Justices Blackmun's and Rehnquist's dissent, 419 U.S. at 614 suggest that Fuentes has been
revitalized.
49. The Court referred to Mitchell almost as the second step of a two step test by first
finding the garnishment statute constitutionally suspect under Fuentes, and then secondarily
looking for Mitchell's saving characteristics. However, the Court made no attempt to balance
the creditor's interest in prejudgment garnishment-an approach strongly suggested in
Mitchell. Rather, the Court returned to the Fuentes approach when confronted by the garni-
sher's argument that the pre-Di-Chem precedents stood for constitutional protection of a
consumer debtor's status and not property rights as such. In such a context, the garnisher
argued, the rationale of those cases would be inapplicable to the instant commercial setting
involving no inordinate leverage. In response, the Court stated it would not distinguish among
different kinds of property. 419 U.S. at 608. If this indicates that the same due process
standards will be applied to all forms of deprivation, it would suggest a retreat from the return
to traditional notions of due process marked by Mitchell. It has been suggested that a "factual
ad hoc determination of realities may no longer be necessary in each case" and that such an
approach will be a two-edged sword with regard to debtors as well as creditors. Comment,
The Evolving Definition of Procedural Due Process in Debtor-Creditor Relations: From Snia-
dach to North Georgia Finishing, 8 Loy. OF L.A.L. REV., 339, 358-59 (1975). The dissent in
Di-Chem applied a balancing test and found a "constitutional accommodation" of the inter-
ests in the Georgia procedural requirements that a suit be filed, double bond be posted, and
apprehension of loss be sworn to by the creditor since the deprivation involved produced no
suffering and little inconvenience. 419 U.S. at 619. One commentator has viewed the Di-Chem
analysis as a shift of focus in balancing from the creditor's interest to the state's interest as a
factor in the equation, such that due process limitations embrace only procedural fairness
and not substantive regulation of the creditor-debtor relationship suggested by Sniadach and
Fuentes. Scott, Constitutional Regulation of Provisional Creditor Remedies: The Cost of
Procedural Due Process, 61 VA. L. REV. 807, 832, 865 (1975).
50. 419 U.S. at 606-07.
51. Jonnet was decided by a three-member panel with two judges, Chief Judge Seitz and
Judge Gibbons, having participated in the Lebowitz decision. See notes 26-31 supra and
accompanying text. Judge Rosenn delivered the Jonnet majority opinion, basing his analysis
on the recent Supreme Court procedural due process precedents in the area of summary
seizures. Judge Gibbons, in his concurring opinion, attacked quasi in rem attachment as a
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[Wihether Pennsylvania summary procedures for jurisdictional
attachment of property of a corporation not registered and hav-
ing no regular place of business in the Commonwealth in a suit
by a resident plaintiff comports with fundamental fairness, in the
absence of notice to the defendant prior to attachment, an oppor-
tunity for prompt hearing to challenge the attachment, and other
procedural safeguards against wrongful seizure.52
After a brief review of the above referenced prejudgment seizure
decisions, the court concluded that the implications from those de-
cisions were applicable to foreign attachment.
Initially, the court believed it necessary to decide the current
precedential value of Ownbey v. Morgan.53 It concluded that the
Supreme Court's current concern for fair procedures to protect a
debtor from any period of unjustified deprivation cast doubt upon
the current validity of Ownbey. Thus, the Jonnet court would limit
Ownbey to the proposition that due process does not require attach-
ments to be preceeded by notice and a hearing. 4
Specifically stating that its analysis was drawn from Mitchell
and Di-Chem, the court proceeded to balance the interests55 at stake
in jurisdictional attachments to determine whether "other safe-
guards" within Pennsylvania's procedures minimized the risk of
wrongful deprivation. It found insubstantial protection against this
risk in that: (1) the praecipe was not required to sufficiently estab-
lish the basis for the action or the colorability of the underlying
claim; (2) the seizure process was entirely ministerial;" (3) the stat-
ute failed to provide for indemnification of a wronged defendant; (4)
valid basis for jurisdiction. Furthermore, the Pennsylvania foreign attachment procedure, as
applied, violated the equal protection clause because it was based on an arbitrary classifica-
tion-the property of nonresidents could be attached while that of residents was protected
from seizure.
52. 530 F.2d at 1125-26.
53. 256 U.S. 94 (1921). Appellants had argued that Ownbey was controlling. Further-
more, the court felt constrained by Ownbey in upholding the same procedures in Lebowitz.
530 F.2d at 1128. For a brief discussion of Ownbey see note 22 supra and accompanying text.
54. 530 F.2d at 1128. "[Tlhe rationale of Ownbey is no longer in harmony with the
principles of Fuentes and its progeny." (emphasis supplied). This also indicates the court's
view that Fuentes is still of major precedential value. See also id. at 1129 n.13.
55. The court indicated that the same result would be reached by applying the Fuentes
"extraordinary situation" criteria of strict judicial control but that it felt bound to apply the
balancing approach. 530 F.2d at 1129 n.13. The interests enumerated were: (1) plaintiff's
interests in establishing jurisdiction in a desired forum and security for satisfaction of the
judgment; and (2) the potential defendant's interests in absolute control over the p -operty
and in not having to litigate in an inconvenient forum. Id. at 1129.
56. The court interpreted Mitchell as not requiring judicial participation in all cases,
however. "Due process requires at a minimum that the sworn statement be presented to an
official with sufficient legal competence to make those determinations . . . ." Id. at 1130.
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there was no provision for a prompt, adequate post-seizure hear-
ing;57 and (5) there were no means by which a defendant could
dissolve the attachment without prejudicing a plaintiff's interests."
The court appears to be correct both in its determination that
a balancing of interests test5" was required and in its analysis of the
form"0 of Pennsylvania's foreign attachment procedures. Although
the court was aware of the competing creditor and debtor interests
and the realities of foreign attachment leverage," it appears that it
completely ignored the interests of the state.62 Unfortunately, rather
57. It was stipulated that there need not be an immediate trial but that plaintiff should
at least demonstrate the probable validity of his claim. Id. at 1130.
58. Reasonable bond, substitution of other property, and dissolution upon entry of a
general appearance were given as examples. Id.
59. The test for procedural due process differs from that for substantive due process. In
the latter the court would uphold a statute if it was reasonable in relation to its subject and
adopted in the interests of the community. See, e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300
U.S. 379 (1937); Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927); Jacobson v. Massachuetts, 197 U.S. 11
(1905). However, this approach has fallen into disrepute. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726
(1963). Furthermore, neither Fuentes, Mitchell, nor Di-Chem were attacked on the basis of
the substance of the statute.
60. The Court in Fuentes, viewing the due process clause as protecting an important
personal right, 407 U.S. at 86, indicated that timing was crucial and that all other factors
were to be balanced merely to determine the form of the pre-seizure hearing. The view of the
current Supreme Court, however, suggests that the protection is one of a property right and
that the form and quality of safeguards are critical. See Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416
U.S. 600, 611 (1974). This difference in theory has been characterized as a shift in focus from
constitutional control of creditor behavior to a constitutional supervision of state dispute
resolution mechanisms. Scott, Constitutional Regulation of Provisional Creditor Remedies:
The Cost of Procedural Due Process, 61 VA. L. REV. 807, 812 (1975). That author suggests
that an explanation for the Supreme Court's failure to explicitly identify the variables that
determine appropriate procedural standards can be found in the Court's unwillingness to
undertake substantive regulation of the bargaining process, its uncertainty that procedural
mechanisms can be adjusted more accurately by constitutional adjudication than by legisla-
tive enactment, and an awareness of the error reduction costs involved if the additional
procedures were applied to all defaulting debtors. Id. at 813.
Another commentator has suggested that the Court's present balancing test fails to
properly take account of the functional characteristics of particular procedures and that even
if corrected it would be inappropriate, because it transforms the right to procedural due
process from a necessary constitutional limitation upon the total power of government over
an individual into merely a check upon the state's procedural policies purportedly advancing
the general welfare. The commentator further suggests that due process analysis should focus
on the quality of the treatment accorded the individual rather than on the importance of
asserted governmental interests in summary action. Note, Specifying the Procedures Re-
quired by Due Process: Toward Limits on the Use of Interest Balancing, 88 HAsv. L. REV.
1510 (1975).
61. See note 55 supra. The court recognized that threat of suit in an inconvenient forum
could considerably prejudice a defendant's negotiating position.
62. For an article extensively analyzing competing interests in the area of foreign attach-
ment see Note, Provisional Remedies and Due Process in Default - Mitchell v. W. T. Grant
Co., 1974 WASH. U.L.Q. 653, 716-24. It has been suggested that whereas the early due process
cases involved an accommodation of private property interests vis-a-vis the public welfare,
the test from Mitchell and Di-Chem equates the creditor's interest in debt collection with
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than attempting to balance the noted factors, the court parroted the
mechanistic comparison approach of Di-Chem. This analysis auto-
matically, and probably incorrectly, assumes that the Mitchell
standards are a concrete constititional boundary for the "other safe-
guards" requirement of protection against wrongful deprivation."'
A parallel unfolding of due process strictures upon a state's
exercise of jurisdiction led Judge Gibbons, in concurring with the
majority's procedural due process analysis in Jonnet, to examine the
constitutionality of quasi in rem jurisdiction." He concluded that
the due process considerations of International Shoe Co. v.
Washington5 defined limitations on jurisdictional power that would
not encompass the quasi in rem action authorized by Pennsylvania's
foreign attachment procedures.
the public welfare for purposes of balancing. Such an approach would seem to further the
chances of allowing summary seizure. 28 VAND. L. REV. 908, 918 (1975).
The court, having cited to Note, Specifying the Procedures Required by Due Process:
Toward Limits on the Use of Interest Balancing, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1510 (1975), 530 F.2d at
1126 n.6 may be indicating sub silentio its acceptance of the suggestion contained therein
that the interest balancing analysis be foresaken in cases where the government can not
demonstrate that withholding procedural safeguards is necessary to protect the rights of
others. The article suggests that a court should ask whether the state's treatment of the
individual is consistent with basic notions of procedural decency and fair dealing rather than
whether the state's procedural policy objectives are socially desirable. 88 HARv. L. REV. at
1543. The court stated: "We require only that Pennsylvania provide procedures consistent
with fundamental fairness for the respective interests of creditor and debtor alike." 530 F.2d
at 1130.
63. This approach was criticized by the dissenters in Di-Chem. 419 U.S. at 614, 620. See
also Note, The Evolving Definition of Procedural Due Process in Debtor-Creditor Relations:
From Sniadach to North Georgia Finishing, 8 Lov. oF L.A.L. Rev. 339, 357-59 (1975). In
foreseeing this approach in subsequent cases, that author suggests the pathway to successful
attack of a summary prejudgment remedy. The debtor must establish crucial indices of
constitutionality from among: (1) judicial participation in the attachment procedure; (2) a
clear demonstration of grounds for attachment; (3) bonding by the creditor; (4) provision for
post-seizure hearing at which grounds are proven or all issues pertaining to continued enforce-
ment of the attachment are resolved; (5) probable cause burden of proof on the creditor; (6)
initiation of suit on the debt underlying the attachment; and (7) an unconditional right in
the debtor to challenge the attachment. A further factor, opportunity for dissolution of the
writ, could be added.
The Supreme Court has recently indicated the continuing vitality of this method of
analysis. Curtis Circulation Co. v. Sugar, 96 S. Ct. 1208 (1976). The Court remanded the case
to the District Court for the Southern District of New York which had struck down the New
York attachment procedures because the hearing available on motion to vacate would not
require plaintiff to sustain a showing that there was probable cause for the seizure-a "re-
quirement" of Mitchell. The Court believed the issue, as a matter of construction, was
sufficiently unclear, such that the New York courts should be allowed to make that determi-
nation. The Court indicated, however, that if it were true that the procedures do not require
a showing of probable cause, they would be unconstitutional.
64. Neither party argued the issue. However, Judge Gibbons' immediate analysis was
foreshadowed by his concurring opinion in Lebowitz v. Forbes Leasing Fin. Corp., 456 F.2d
979, 982 (1972).
65. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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The issue, as seen in this context, was whether due process
would be satisfied when judicial power was exercised with reference
to a fictional situs of property rather than a minimum contacts
analysis." Judge Gibbons found that the pre-fourteenth amend-
ment precedents for quasi in rem jurisdiction were concerned with
sovereignty rather than fairness, and therefore would not support
the contemporary due process philosophy espoused by International
Shoe. 7 Limiting Pennoyer v. Neff" to stand solely for the immuta-
ble principle that judicial power of the states is delimited by the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment, he suggested that the
artificiality of the reasoning in Harris v. Balk,6" the cornerstone of
foreign attachment, would not comport with today's notions of fair
play and substantial justice. 0 Refusing to confine the minimum
contacts analysis to in personam jurisdiction, Judge Gibbons stated
that the same limitations of fundamental fairness should apply to
any exercise of the state's judicial power.7
An analysis of the relevant contacts revealed that the defendant
was not doing business in Pennsylvania and that all of the impor-
tant events occurred outside Pennsylvania. 2 The mere fact that all
66. 530 F.2d at 1139. With respect to in personam jurisdiction, the Court in International
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945), stated that due process "may be met by
such contacts . . . with the state of the forum as make it reasonable . . . to require [defense
ofl the particular suit which is brought there."
67. The precedents arose from attacks based on the full faith and credit clause of the
Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. Citing Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940), he
found that the Court had abandoned notions of sovereignty, which had confined process to
state borders. For the proposition that the fictional situs of intangibles was no substitute in
a quasi in rem case for a minimum contacts analysis Judge Gibbons cited Aldrich v. State
Tax Comm'n, 316 U.S. 174 (1942) (local contacts analysis with respect to jurisdiction to tax
intangibles); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 311-13 (1950)
(local contacts analysis with respect to jurisdiction to adjudicate trust obligations); Texas v.
New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674, final decree entered, 380 U.S. 518 (1965) (escheat cases recognizing
due process limitations on chartering states to insist upon the fiction of a local situs for
corporate securities and debts). 530 F.2d at 1137-38.
68. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
69. 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
70. Futhermore, Judge Gibbons stated that jurisdictional analysis up to International
Shoe had been defined more by "reference to common law rules than by probing analysis of
constitutional precepts." 530 F.2d at 1132. As a final retort he stated that even if quasi in
rem jurisdiction comports with due process, the precedents do not support the use of foreign
attachment in federal courts. Id.
71. In phrasing the International Shoe holding as a redefinition of "the due process
limitations upon the exercise of judicial power over disputes foreign to the forum," Judge
Gibbons refused to limit the holding to in personam jurisdiction. 530 F.2d at 1131. Citing
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 312-13 (1950) and Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 245-46 (1958), he found support for his belief that the content of
constitutional due process would not vary between a litigant defending title to property and
one defending from liability in personam. 530 F.2d at 1137.
72. The loan commitment had been entered into in New York. 530 F.2d at 1131. The
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plaintiffs were Pennsylvania residents was irrelevant without there
being a significantly closer relationship to the underyling dispute.
Thus, Judge Gibbons decided that Pennsylvania's exercise of juris-
diction was fundamentally unfair to the defendant and an encroach-
ment upon the sovereignty of a sister state."
The postulation that the scope of quasi in rem jurisdiction is
coextensive with in personam jurisdiction would convert Pennsyl-
vania's foreign attachment procedures pro tanto into a domestic
attachment device. Since Pennsyvlvania had abolished the attach-
ment of property of persons not foreign to the forum,74 Judge Gib-
bons found a violation of the fourteenth amendment equal protec-
tion clause.7"
The modern utility and validity of quasi in rem jurisdiction has
been examined extensively by the commentators." The territorial
approach to jurisdiction has been greatly eroded." With the evolu-
tion of alternative methods of securing jurisdiction over persons not
Pennsylvania long-arm statute was inapplicable.
73. He found that International Shoe stood for two due process limitations on state
judicial power: (1) Out of respect for federalism, a state must have an interest in adjudicating
that is rationally connected to its public policy so as not to abridge the sovereign rights of a
sister state; (2) the plaintiff's state cannot coerce defense of a suit in a forum which, because
of its remoteness from defendant's residence, witnesses, and proof, would be fundamentally
unfair. 530 F.2d at 1140.
74. PA. R. Civ. P. 1480 (a).
75. Judge Gibbon reasoned that since the purpose of prejudgment attachment is to
insure satisfaction of a subsequent judgment, there was no rational basis for finding nonresi-
dents more likely to circumvent plaintiff's recovery. 530 F.2d at 1142-43.
76. See, e.g., R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971); Beale, The
Exercise of Jurisdiction In Rem to Compel Payment of a Debt, 27 HARV. L. REV. 107 (1913);
Carrington, The Modern Utility of Quasi In Rem Jurisdiction, 76 HARV. L. REV. 303 (1962);
Von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV.
1121 (1966); Note, Developments in the Law - State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. REV.
909 (1960); Comment, Foreign Attachment after Sniadach and Fuentes, 73 COLUM. L. REV.
342 (1973); 14 ST. Louis U.L.J. 548 (1970).
77. This approach, which was the rationalizing principle in Pennoyer, permitted the
presence of property in the forum to be utilized as a generally affiliating basis for jurisdiction
over a defendant's interest in the property. The physical power reference limited a state's
process to its territorial boundaries. The erosion occurred primarily because of the need,
under that approach, that every res have a situs. A very mechanistic approach to jurisdiction
developed with courts attempting to fit situations into the categories of in rem, quasi in rem,
or in personam jurisdiction. Consequently, the true interests a forum had in opening its courts
to litigation were ignored. Harris was a good example of this approach and has been attacked
as combining two of the worst features of American jurisdictional law-transient personal
presence as a generally affiliating basis and attachment of an interest in property to confer
limited general jurisdiction. R. WEINTRAUB, note 76 supra, at 147. The growth of the United
States brought about the dominance of corporations as interstate commercial persons and
intangibles as wealth. Moreover, persons in one jurisdiction began to vitally affect those in
other jurisdictions. This set the stage for a rethinking of jurisdictional principles which
culminated in International Shoe.
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amenable to personal service,7" the need for the concept of quasi-
in rem jurisdiction has passed." The focus is shifting from a ques-
tion of power over person and things, to a functional analysis of the
relationship of the. parties and controversy to the forum.' Absent
extraordinary circumstances, the mere fortuitous presence of a de-
fendant's property in the forum is not a reasonable basis for jurisdic-
tion.
Foreign attachment procedures are not unconstitutional, per
se, under the Sniadach/Di/Chem due process formulation. The
principle remaining from that line of decisions is that there must be
an opportunity for adequate adjudication at an appropriate time. In
the limited number of situations justifying dispensation with the
normal due process requirements of prior notice and hearing, other
procedural safeguards must be provided to minimize the risk of
arbitrary deprivation. These safeguards will vary with the nature of
the interests involved and the functional utility of the procedures
acting on these interests. Application of a functional balancing of
interests test remains uncertain because of the Supreme Court's
mechanistic approach in Di-Chem. Consequently, summary seizure
procedures attacked will probably continue to be placed in the de
facto continuum between Fuentes and Mitchell, reflecting to a cer-
tain extent a court's subjective attitude toward creditor remedies.
To be assured of constitutionality, state statutes would appear to
have to contain all of the saving factors of Mitchell, which may be
impossible. Furthermore, the vitality of quasi in rem jurisdiction
is questionable due to the development of specific jurisdiction
78. For an excellent synoposis of the cases representing the progression of this rational
approach to jurisdiction begun by International Shoe see Comment, A New Expansion of
Jurisdiction? 6 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 105, 108-15 (1974).
79. But see Lebowitz v. Forbes Leasing & Fin. Corp., 456 F.2d 979 (1972); Levy,
Attachment, Garnishment and Garnishment Execution: Some American Problems Consid-
ered in Light of the English Experience, 5 CONN. L. REV. 399 (1972-73) suggesting arguments
for the continued use of quasi in rem jurisdiction.
80. An excellent example of this is Judge Traynor's decision in Atkinson v. Superior
Court, 49 Cal. 2d 338, 316 P.2d 960 (1957). The approach has, as its core, justice and fair
play as a general theory of jurisdiction. It analyzes and balances conflicting interests to reach
a result that comports with fundamental fairness. This functional approach is analogous to
the current emphasis with regard to choice of law. See generally R. WEINTRAUB, note 76 supra.
Numerous factors to be regarded in the balancing test have been suggested: (a) defendant's
ownership of tangible property within the state; (b) applicability of the state's law to the
dispute; (c) domicile of the plaintiff within the state; (d) unavailability of another forum in
which the controversy can be fully adjudicated; (e) risk of multiple liability if jurisdiction is
denied; (f) availability of evidence in the state; (g) expectations of the parties as to the place
of suit; (h) the relationship between the state or the defendant's property in the state and
either the transaction or occurrence giving rise to the suit or the objective of the action; (i)
the relationship of the proceeding in question to another action pending in the same state;
and (j) the nature of the relief sought against a nonresident defendant. Note, Developments
in the Law-State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. REV. 909, 965-66 (1960).
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based upon indirectly affiliating circumstances.' It is hoped that
the Supreme Court will soon confront this issue and will invalidate
the use of the quasi in rem concept. Even if the concept continues
to withstand attack, current due process standards of fair play sug-
gest that quasi in rem jurisdiction should not be a sufficiently com-
pelling state interest to override the requirements of prior notice and
hearing.
JAMES S. CARMICHAEL
Postal Employees Are Not Protected From
Garnishment
The doctrine of sovereign immunity no longer protects the wages
of postal employees from garnishment. The traditional ban on
garnishment on the grounds of immunity of the government from
suit is no longer applicable to the United States Postal Service
after the Postal Reorganization Act which created an indepen-
dent federal agency amenable to suit.
In each of three district court cases, a garnishment summons
directed to the United States Postal Service (USPS) to effect judg-
ments in state courts was challenged by the federal government.
The district court quashed the garnishment summons in each case
on the basis that the USPS, as an independent establishment of the
executive branch of the federal government performing a govern-
mental function, was immune to suit. On appeal brought by the
judgment creditors, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit held, reversed per curiam: The Postal Reorganization
Act created an independent postal business and contains an implied
Congressional waiver of governmental immunity thus subjecting the
Postal Service to garnishment procedures to effect judgments in
state courts. Standard Oil Division, American Oil Co. v. Starks, 528
F.2d 201 (7th Cir. 1975).
With the increasing role played by the federal government in
our society and with the resulting increase in the number of public
81. Specific jurisdiction is the assertion of power to adjudicate, limited to matters arising
out of or intimately related to affiliating circumstances on which the jurisdictional claim is
based. The indirectly affiliating circumstances supporting jurisdiction have been categorized
into (a) the continuous relationship of the defendant to the forum and (b) isolated events or
transactions. See Von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested
Analy.is, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1144-48 (1966).
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